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Abstract—In this paper, we demonstrate a security approach
for the class of highly-programmable analog Integrated Circuits
(ICs) that can be used as a countermeasure for unauthorized chip
use and piracy. The approach relies on functionality locking, i.e. a
lock mechanism is introduced into the design such that unless the
correct key is provided the functionality breaks. We show that
for highly-programmable analog ICs the programmable fabric
can naturally be used as the lock mechanism. We demonstrate
the approach on a multi-standard RF receiver with configuration
settings of 64-bit words.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware security and trust is a topic that has attracted
a lot of interest in recent years. There are various threats,
including IC/IP piracy, hardware Trojans, side-channel attacks,
and fault injection attacks, which can have serious implications
on the technological value chain (e.g. CAD tool providers,
IC/IP providers, original equipment manufacturers, and users),
on governments, and on the society as a whole [1].
While hardware security and trust aspects have been exten-
sively studied for digital circuits, the space of vulnerabilities
and solutions for analog circuits is largely unexplored and little
understood as of today [2], [3].
In this paper, we address the problem of analog IC/IP
piracy, which includes reverse engineering and counterfeiting.
Reverse engineering refers to the derivation of IC/IP propri-
etary information, i.e. architecture, netlist, layout, etc. It aims
at reducing the attacker’s technological disadvantage against
the “author” of the IC/IP, gathering necessary information for
producing a similar or identical IC/IP, e.g. a counterfeit, or
locating the root-of-trust part of the IC/IP to steal secret infor-
mation, such as cipher keys. Nowadays, there exist equipment
and software tools to successfully reverse-engineer any unpro-
tected IC/IP [4]. Counterfeiting includes cloning, recycling,
overproducing, and remarking [5]. A cloned counterfeit is an
IC/IP that is illegally cloned and sold as original. Cloning
can be performed by an untrusted foundry or an adversary
via reverse-engineering. A recycled counterfeit is a used and
possibly aged IC that is illegally resold as new. Overproduced
ICs are ICs that are produced by an untrusted foundry beyond
the number agreed in the contract with the IC design house
and are illegitimately sold in after market. Remarked ICs are
failing ICs that are remarked by an untrusted test facility as
passing ICs and are sold with false and forged documentation.
In particular, in this paper, we propose a security approach
based on locking for the class of highly-programmable analog
ICs. The approach can be used not only for prevention of
unauthorized chip use, but, in addition, it can offer a strong
countermeasure against reverse engineering and counterfeiting.
Fig. 1. Locking techniques for analog ICs: (a) locking biases based on
memristor crossbars [6]; (b) obfuscating biasing transistors [7]; (c) locking of
current mirrors [8]; (d) locking mixed-signal circuits via logic locking of their
digital section [9]; (e) logic locking of the digital optimizer in the calibration
feedback loop [10]; (f) locking through neural network-based biasing [11].
We argue that the tuning knobs within the programmable
analog IC can naturally serve as a locking mechanism. Specif-
ically, the programming bits controlling the tuning knobs
serve as key-bits and each configuration setting, e.g. pro-
gramming bits that configure the IC in a specific operation
mode demanded by the application, is treated as a secret key.
Naturally, when invalid programming bits are provided the
functionality of the circuit breaks, that is, its functionality
is “locked”. We discuss the practical implementation of this
security approach, its benefits compared to existing locking
techniques, and its resilience against foreseen attacks. We
demonstrate it on a highly-programmable, multi-standard RF
receiver with configuration settings of 64-bit words.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, we discuss previous work on analog circuit locking. In
Section III, we provide a general overview of programmability
embedded into analog ICs. In Section IV, we present the
proposed technique for securing programmable analog ICs.
In Section V, we present our case study. In Section VI, we
demonstrate the efficiency of locking and the achieved security
level. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PREVIOUS WORK ON ANALOG CIRCUIT LOCKING
Techniques for locking of analog circuits are proposed
in [6]–[11] and are illustrated in Fig. 1. In [6], a locking
mechanism based on an architecture that comprises memristor
crossbars is used to lock the body biasing of the transistor
input pair in a sense amplifier. In [7], it is proposed to replace
transistors within the biasing circuit with parallel-connected
transistors whose gates are controlled by key-bits. The key-
bits set an aggregate width equal to the width of the original
transistor. In [8], it is shown how to redesign the current
mirrors providing the biasing so as to insert key-bits. In [9],
it is proposed to lock a mixed-signal circuit via logic locking
of its digital section. This technique was demonstrated in an
audio application in [12] allowing to listen to the effect of
locking on the audio quality. In [10], it is proposed to lock via
logic locking the digital optimizer into the calibration feedback
loop, such that the wrong tuning settings are generated unless
the valid key is applied. In [11], it is proposed to add on-chip
a neural network that is trained to map the secret analog key,
which is in the form of analog DC voltages presented as inputs
to the neural network, to the correct biases.
The locking approaches in [6]–[8], [11] act on the biasing
of the circuit. This makes them vulnerable to removal attacks
since the attacker does not have to recover the key; it suffices
to recover the biases, which are typically small in number,
and thereafter replace the locked blocks with “fresh ones” that
provide the correct biases.
In contrast to biases that are fixed for every fabricated chip,
tuning knobs are set per fabricated chip to compensate for
process variations, thus to break the technique in [10] the
attacker will need to actually search for the secret key. The
same holds for the technique in [9] which does not lock the
biasing or tuning knobs, but locks directly the functionality.
Still, [9], [10] are vulnerable to removal attacks as the attacker
may replace the locked digital optimizer in [10] or the locked
digital section in [9] with “fresh” unlocked designs, although
arguably this is a much more difficult task than redesigning
the biasing circuitry.
III. PROGRAMMABLE ANALOG ICS
Analog circuits are often made programmable (or config-
urable) with the aim to: (a) Compensate for process variations
so as to increase yield; (b) Compensate for inherent non-
idealities so as to achieve the desired performance trade-
off; (c) Configure the circuit into different operation modes
demanded by the application; (d) Adapt the performances to
changes in the environment.
The calibration mechanism that enables programmability (or
configuration) consists of tuning knobs judiciously inserted
into the design and a calibration algorithm that is driven by
performance indicators and returns the programming bits (or
configuration setting). Often the same calibration mechanism
is used to achieve simultaneously multiple of the above objec-
tives. Typically process variations are taken into consideration
during calibration, thus the configuration settings end up being
unique for each chip.
The calibration algorithm can either run on-chip in hardware
pointing to autonomous self-calibration or can run off-chip in
software during the post-manufacturing testing phase, relying
on external Automated Test Equipment (ATE).
Fig. 2. Locking via the programming fabric.
Fig. 3. Key management schemes.
For objectives (c)-(d), operation modes and adaptation levels
are pre-specified based on the anticipated range of appli-
cations and environmental conditions, resulting in multiple
pre-specified configuration settings that are pre-loaded into
an on-chip look-up table (LUT). Instead, for objectives (a)-
(b), the calibration algorithm returns a single best possible
configuration setting and the LUT has essentially one line.
The above discussion remains quite general; in fact, the
calibration mechanism varies from one circuit class to another,
and programmability may vary from a few bits for calibrating
single blocks [13] to tens of bits for calibrating complete
systems [14].
IV. SECURING HIGHLY-PROGRAMMABLE ANALOG ICS
A. Locking via the programmability fabric
In this work, we argue that for highly-programmable circuits
it is not required to insert additional circuitry on-chip in
order to introduce key-bits. Instead, we can take advantage
of the embedded programmable fabric so as to naturally
perform the locking operation, as shown in Fig. 2. Specifically,
the configuration settings can be treated as secret keys or,
equivalently, the programming bits can be treated as secret
key-bits. Similarly, the calibration algorithm that produces the
configurations settings is kept secret and is not shared with
untrusted parties. Using invalid programming bits will result
in complete loss of functionality or in significant performance
degradation, that is, one or more performances will lie far
outside their allowable specification range.
Exploiting the embedded programmability for performing
the locking operation presents significant advantages. Unlike
known approaches for locking analog ICs which all modify to
some degree the design [6]–[11], with the proposed approach
the design is left completely intact. Therefore, there is no
need for redesign, no extra design iterations, and, most impor-
tantly, no performance degradation. In addition, the proposed
approach does not increase the power or area of the analog
IC itself. The power and area overheads are only due to the
key management scheme, which can be shared for enabling
security for all other blocks on the same die, i.e. in the context
of a System-on-Chip (SoC).
The possible secret key management schemes are the same
ones used by logic locking techniques for digital ICs [15]. One
option is to store the LUT with the configuration settings into a
tamper-proof memory, as shown in Fig. 3(a). A second option,
illustrated in Fig. 3(b), makes use of a Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) [16]. The PUF needs to take at least as
many challenges as the total number of configuration settings.
The PUF generates a number of secret identification keys
that equals the number of configuration settings. The user
is given a number of keys that also equals the number of
configuration settings, such that when these keys are XORed
with the identification keys the correct configuration settings
are produced. In both schemes, in normal operation mode
the circuit commands dynamically the memories to load the
corresponding programming bits.
B. Attack scenarios and resilience analysis
We assume that an attacker has full capabilities, i.e., has the
netlist and access to working oracle chips.
1) Attacks in digital domain: Known attacks in digital
domain, such as the lethal SAT attack [17], are not applicable.
2) Removal attacks: Removal attacks, which is the main
limitation in [6]–[11] as described in Section II, are not
applicable as there is no added circuitry on-chip to facilitate
the key insertion; the key directly applies to existing tuning
knobs into the design.
3) Brute-force and multi-objective optimization attacks:
The most trivial attack is the brute-force attack which consists
in applying random combinations of programming bits until
the one that unlocks the circuit is found.
The multi-objective optimization attack consists in applying
an iterative algorithm that searches for a configuration setting
that simultaneously optimizes the performances such that they
all satisfy their specifications. This attack is difficult to put
in place since typically only a small subset of programming
bits shows a smooth monotonic relationship with a given
performance, and this requires that the rest of the programming
bits are already correctly set.
Performing the brute-force and multi-objective optimization
attacks by simulation is impractical due to very long analog
simulation times. To perform these attacks much faster in
hardware, the attacker needs first to re-fab the circuit so as
to gain direct access to programming bits. In this case, if the
programming bits are unique for each chip, then these attacks
become meaningful only if the resultant key-bit combination
can be used to set a good starting point for launching a gradient
search for quickly calibrating any chip.
A question rises whether the design can be divided in sub-
blocks, tracing key bits to sub-blocks, and enabling smaller
brute-force and multi-objective optimization attacks at sub-
block level. This is typically not possible due to the internal
feedback loops that involve multiple sub-blocks each. More-
over, this would require re-fabbing so as to provide intermedi-
ate taps to access directly sub-blocks for measurement, which
is only possible for low-frequency sub-blocks.
It should be noted that unlike logic locking of digital circuits
where there is a single valid key, for analog circuits it is likely
that a number of key-bit combinations result in a satisfactory
performance trade-off, although this number is typically a very
small fraction of all key-bit combinations.
Clearly, resilience against these attacks increases with the
number of programming bits and with simulation or measure-
ment time per trial.
4) Revealing the calibration algorithm: In the case of an
on-chip calibration, an attacker that extracts the netlist will
also have at hand the hardware that implements the calibration
feedback loop and, thereby, it may be fairly easy to extract the
calibration algorithm. In this scenario, we can envision logic
locking of the digital section of the calibration feedback loop
[9], [10].
In the case of an off-chip calibration, the attacker may target
speculating the calibration algorithm by studying the circuit
architecture. However, very often the calibration algorithm is
very specific and esoteric to the design, that is, intended for
or understood only by the designer. Thus, the attacker must
have a very high and specialized expertise and a thorough
understanding of the design so as to be able to conceive the
underlying calibration algorithm. This is in contrast to the
security assumption, in the sense that if the attacker is so
knowledgeable, then the attacker may as well design the circuit
from scratch instead of pirating an existing one, given also
that piracy by an attacker other than the foundry requires a
sophisticated and expensive reverse-engineering infrastructure.
This is a new type of attack specific to the countermeasure that
is proposed. In general, it opens a discussion of securing and
obfuscating calibration algorithms when they are considered
to be a valuable intellectual property of the design. A metric
to quantify the difficulty for reverse-engineering a calibration
algorithm will need to devised also.
A problem that needs to be addressed is how to protect
the calibration algorithm against an untrusted test facility.
For programmable analog circuits, multiple test/calibration
iterations are carried out during testing for searching in the
space of configuration settings. The search is not random, but
is driven by the calibration algorithm. In each step of the
algorithm, the next configuration setting is dictated by tests
done using the current configuration setting. If the calibration
runs entirely on-chip, then it is transparent to the test facility.
If the calibration runs off-chip, then the obvious workaround is
that the foundry returns the manufactured chips to the design
house, where the test/calibration steps are performed in a
secured environment. However, this option is practical only in
the case of low-volume products. For high-volume products, it
is straightforward to adapt the concept of remotely activating
the chips using asymmetric cryptography [15].
Fig. 4. Architecture of programmable multi-standard RF receiver.
C. Threats being addressed
Assuming resilience against the aforementioned attacks, the
proposed approach can be used as countermeasure for reverse-
engineering, cloning, overproducing, and remarking. It can
offer resilience against recycling only if the key management
scheme in Fig. 3(b) is used and the unique user keys are loaded
every time at power-on. More specifically, a cloned counterfeit
that can be produced by reverse-engineering a chip or by the
untrusted foundry is good-for-nothing if the adversary does not
know how the design can be programmed. Resilience against
overproducing can be achieved since the design house can have
control over the number of correctly programmed fabricated
chips. Remarking can be achieved since the design house
can load after unsuccessful calibration wrong configuration
settings to render the chip totally malfunctional.
V. CASE STUDY: PROGRAMMABLE MULTI-STANDARD RF
RECEIVER
Our case study is a programmable highly-digitized multi-
standard 65 nm CMOS RF receiver. It is made re-configurable
such that it can serve for establishing communication using
several standards within the frequency range from 1.5 GHz to
3.0 GHz, including Bluetooth, ZigBee, WiFi 802.11b, etc.
A. Architecture and Programmability
Fig. 4 shows the block-level schematic of the RF receiver.
It is composed of a Variable Gain Low Noise Amplifier
(VGLNA), a band-pass (BP) RF Σ∆ modulator, a digital
down-conversion mixer, and a digital decimation filter. In total,
there are 64 programming bits embedded into the analog sec-
tion and 3 programming bits embedded into the digital section.
The calibration is run off-chip and returns the programming
bits per standard in the presence of process variations, thus
resulting in unique configuration settings per standard and
per chip. For the purpose of locking, we consider only the
programming bits of the analog section since the calibration
of the digital section for a given standard is straightforward.
The block-level schematic of the VGLNA is shown in Fig.
5. It is composed of five gain stages with a resistive feedback.
It features a 4-bit configuration word with which the VGLNA
can attain 16 different gain levels so as to adapt the sensitivity
and dynamic range of the RF receiver to the specifications
imposed by the target standard.
The block-level schematic of the BP RF Σ∆ modulator
is illustrated in Fig. 6 [18]. It is composed of an input
transconductance, Gmin, an LC bandpass loop filter with
two capacitor arrays Cc and Cf for coarse- and fine-tuning,
Fig. 5. Architecture of tunable variable gain LNA.
Fig. 6. Architecture of tunable BP RF Σ∆ modulator.
respectively, a pre-amplifier, a comparator, a loop delay, a
feedback Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC), and an output
buffer. For a target standard, the modulator uses a 60-bit
configuration word to tune the center frequency and quality
factor of the LC bandpass loop filter in the presence of
process variations, as well as to trim the biasing current of
the other blocks in order to compensate for process variations
and improve the performance trade-off.
B. Calibration Algorithm
The calibration procedure for a target standard is as follows:
1) The comparator is configured as a buffer by deactivating
its driving clock.
2) The output buffer is configured to adapt the output of
the BP RF Σ∆ modulator to its off-chip load during
calibration. This output buffer is removed from the
signal path in normal operation mode.
3) The RF input signal is disabled by turning off the input
transconductor Gmin.
4) The feedback loop with the DAC and loop delay is
turned off.
5) Having deactivated the feedback loop, the LC loop filter
is put in oscillation mode by setting its Q-enhancement
transconductor, -ve Gm, to its maximum.
6) The capacitor arrays Cc and Cf of the LC tank are tuned
until the output frequency is equal to the desired center
frequency.
7) The Q-enhancement transconductor, -ve Gm, is reduced
gradually until oscillation vanishes.
8) The feedback loop is restored.
9) The BP RF Σ∆ modulator is put in the operating mode
by applying an RF input signal with frequency F0.
10) The sampling frequency is set to Fs = 4 · F0.
11) The loop delay is set according to Fs.
12) The VGLNA is tuned to set the appropriate sensitivity
and dynamic range.
13) The input transconductance Gmin, the feedback DAC,
the pre-amplifier and the comparator are initialized to
their nominal values determined by simulation.
14) An iterative procedure is used to determine the config-
uration words of these blocks through the improvement
of the measured Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and Spu-
rious Free Dynamic Range (SFDR) of the BP RF Σ∆
modulator.
Fig. 7. SNR for correct key (blue cross) and invalid keys (gray dots and red
dot with index 7) computed at the output of the BP RF Σ∆ modulator.
Fig. 8. Transient output of BP RF Σ∆ modulator for the correct key (top)
and the invalid key with index 7 in Fig. 7 (bottom).
VI. RESULTS
A. Locking efficiency
For a given center frequency or standard, there is an optimal
combination of the 64 programming bits composing a secret
key that unlocks functionality. We will consider the maximum
center frequency, e.g. 3 GHz, and we will demonstrate the
locking efficiency when applying invalid keys. The circuit has
several performances, including SNR, dynamic range, SFDR,
etc., and locking succeeds when at least one performance
violates its specification.
We assume that the attacker has extracted the netlist of the
circuit and can simulate it at transistor-level with the ability to
monitor internal nodes that shed more light into the operation.
We consider first the SNR observed at the output of the BP RF
Σ∆ modulator for an input sinusoidal signal with frequency
3 GHz and power -25 dBm. The SNR is computed for an
Oversampling Ratio (OSR) of 64 and based on a 8192 point
FFT. Fig. 7 shows the SNR across 100 randomly generated
keys and the correct key. As it can be seen, the correct key
stands out resulting in an SNR of over 40 dB, while for invalid
keys the SNR is less than 30 dB. In fact, for most invalid
keys the SNR is below 0 dB, which means that the input
signal gets buried under the noise level or there are harmonics
within the band-of-interest. However, there are 4 invalid keys
that have an SNR higher than 10 dB, and among them one
has an SNR of about 30 dB. This key with index 7 in Fig.
7 naturally would attract the attention of the attacker. But, in
fact, it turns out to result in a “deceptive” SNR. Looking into
the programming bits corresponding to this key, the feedback
loop of the BP RF Σ∆ modulator is open and, in addition, the
comparator operates as a buffer. In this way, the analog signal
passes without being digitized, thus there is no quantization
noise being added. Fig. 8 shows the transient output of the BP
Fig. 9. SNR for correct key (blue cross) and invalid keys (gray dots and red
dot with index 7) computed at the output of the RF receiver.
Fig. 10. PSD at the output of the BP RF Σ∆ modulator for the correct key
(blue) and the invalid key with index 7 in Figs. 7 and 9 (red).
RF Σ∆ modulator for the correct key and the invalid key with
index 7. The correct output is an oversampled bitstream, while
the output for the invalid key is an analog waveform showing
no analog-to-digital conversion. This analog waveform when
it passes directly through the digital section of the RF receiver
will show a reduced SNR. This is shown in Fig. 9, where now
the SNR measured at the output of the RF receiver is plotted.
The SNR for the correct key does not change as expected and
for some invalid keys the SNR is further reduced. In short,
all invalid keys show an SNR of less than 10 dB, that is, the
functionality is significantly corrupted.
Fig. 10 shows the Power Spectral Density (PSD) at the
output of the BP RF Σ∆ modulator for the correct key and
the invalid key with index 7. As it can be seen, for the invalid
key there is no noise shaping, which is the main characteristic
of the BP RF Σ∆ modulator.
Fig. 11 shows the dynamic range of the RF receiver for the
correct key and the invalid key with index 7. The input range
is divided into three segments, e.g. [-85:-45], [-60:-20], and
[-40:0], and for each segment the VGLNA is tuned to have
the appropriate gain level and sensitivity. While Figs. 7 and 9
show the SNR just for an input power of -25 dBm, Fig. 11
plots the SNR for different input power values with a step of
5 dBm. As it can be seen, the behavior of the locked circuit
across the input range is very different as compared to the
unlocked circuit.
Fig. 12 shows the SFDR for the correct key and the invalid
key with index 7. SFDR is measured by applying a two-
tone input, where the two tones have the same power and
a frequency difference of 10 MHz. SFDR is the difference
between the power of the fundamental and the third harmonic.
As it can be seen, the locked circuit has a much lower SFDR.
Finally, the same experiment was repeated for other center
Fig. 11. SNR versus input power with different LNA gain settings for the
correct key (blue) and the invalid key with index 7 in figures 7 and 9 (red).
Fig. 12. SFDR for the correct key (blue) and the invalid key with index 7 in
Figs. 7 and 9 (red).
frequencies and qualitatively the results were identical.
B. Security Analysis
1) Brute-force and multi-objective optimization attacks:
Simulation of this device is too time-consuming, thus the
attacker will need to re-fab the chip so as to perform the
analysis in hardware. For example, for a single key and a 8192
point FFT, it takes about 20 minutes to simulate the SNR at
the output of the RF receiver for a given input, 3 hours to
simulate the SNR across the input range, and 30 minutes to
simulate the SFDR.
Most sub-blocks are included in a feedback loop which
makes it impossible to calibrate individual sub-blocks. Also,
to calibrate a sub-block, the rest of the sub-blocks need to
be conditioned appropriately. Besides, the circuit carries high-
frequency signals and re-fabbing a chip with intermediate taps
for observing internal signals would result in performance loss.
Resilience against these attacks is also naturally achieved
thanks to the large key-width of 64 bits which explodes the
search space. It is very unlikely that many key-bit com-
binations could result in satisfactory performance trade-off.
For example, capacitor arrays are binary-weighted, thus for a
desired capacitor value there is a unique sub-key.
2) Speculating the calibration algorithm: The calibration
procedure is arguably very complex and its steps cannot be
easily retraced by conjecture even under the assumption that
the attacker has strong analog design expertise. In particular:
(a) The circuit needs to be reconfigured appropriately multiple
times during calibration; (b) The calibration of many sub-
blocks requires initial programming bits that are dictated by
design simulation and are unknown to the attacker; (c) The
order with which the different blocks should be calibrated is
very specific; (d) The feedback loop prohibits calibration of
individual sub-blocks.
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose a locking methodology for highly-
programmable analog ICs that relies on securing the
configuration settings as well as the underlying calibration
algorithm. The methodology can be used as a countermeasure
for unauthorized chip use and piracy. It is demonstrated
on a multi-standard RF receiver with 64 programming bits.
The proposed methodology has the advantage that it is
strictly non-intrusive to the design and has zero power and
area overheads, except for the overheads due to the key
management scheme.
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